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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL
As the gravamen of this case is a commercial transaction, Saint Alphonsus requests fees
and costs on cross-appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Appellate Rules 40 and 41.
ARGUMENT
I.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S DEPARTING PARTNER SHARE WAS PROPERLY
CALCULATED AS DIRECTED IN RUPA
This lawsuit began with an equitable claim by Plaintiff Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,

Inc., for the return of its interest in the MRIA partnership following its April 2004 dissociation,
as calculated by the buyout provisions of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"). See
Idaho Code § 53-3-70 1(b). During the first trial, MRIA contended that Section 6.2 of the MRIA
partnership agreement (Ex. 4023) limited the required buyout payment to the amount in the
Hospital's capital account when it dissociated (approximately $860,000). See 2007 R., Vol. XII,
at 2309. Judge McLaughlin rejected this argument, holding that the statutory provision
controlled, and that Saint Alphonsus was therefore entitled to a buyout payment of $4.6 million,
representing the Hospital's share ofMRIA's going-concern value at the time of dissociation. Id.
at 2311. MRIA did not appeal, and Judge Wetherell accordingly reinstated that judgment
following this Court's remand for a new trial on MRIA's counterclaims. R. 1377-78. MRIA
now argues that Judge Wetherell erred in doing so. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, as the trial court correctly held, Judge McLaughlin's 2007 award of the Hospital's

departing-partner share is res judicata, and MRIA was not entitled to ask Judge Wetherell-and
is not now entitled to ask this Court-to change the judgment. MRIA admits it did not challenge
Judge McLaughlin's decision in its first cross-appeal to this Court, and thus, as a matter of law,
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the issue is final and binding on the parties. See Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709,201 P.3d
1282, 1286 (2009) (unappealed ruling becomes the law of the case and cannot be challenged in
subsequent proceedings); Idaho First Nat 'I Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 29192,824 P.2d 841, 866-67 (1991) (unappealed issues are "laid to rest" and "will not be issues on
retrial"); R. 1378 ("Judge McLaughlin's decision regarding the share of the partnership to which
Saint Alphonsus is entitled stands and remains the law of the case.").
MRIA nonetheless argues that it may raise the issue anew because, when this Court
overruled Judge McLaughlin's holding that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated, it
implicitly upset the "underpinnings" of Judge McLaughlin's unchallenged buyout ruling as well.
Cross-Appellants' Brief ("MRIA Cross-Appeal Br.") 5-10. But MRIA could and should have
raised any arguments aboutthe alleged interrelatedness of the two rulings in its cross-appeal after
the first trial, and its failure to do so would bar re-litigation of the buyout claim under settled
law-of-the-case principles even if there were now a tension between the rationale of this Court's
dissociation ruling and the rationale of the trial court's unappealed buyout ruling.
In any event, even a cursory review of the two rulings shows that no such tension exists.
In his dissociation ruling, Judge McLaughlin held that dissociation was wrongful because the
four enumerated bases for withdrawal set forth in Article 6.1 of the MRIA partnership agreement,
none of which was a basis for the Hospital's dissociation, constituted an "express provision"
foreclosing dissociation for any other reason pursuant to RUPA. 2007 R., Vol XII, at 2309-11;
see also Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b). On appeal, this Court reversed on the ground that Article
6.1's four enumerated grounds for withdrawal were not an "express provision," and thus did not
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limit the Hospital's statutory right under RUPA to dissociate for other reasons. Saint Alphonsus

Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 487, 224 P.3d 1068,1076 (2009)
("SADC"). The entire premise of this ruling was that the Hospital dissociated pursuant to the
statutory power under RUPA, not pursuant to Article 6.l of the contract.
This Court's decision is thus entirely consistent with Judge McLaughlin's ruling
calculating the departing-partner share under the formula in RUPA and not under the formula in
Article 6.1 of the partnership agreement. Judge McLaughlin reasoned that "the buyout
calculation provision contained in Article 6.1 and the payment timing provision contained in
Article 6.2 were only applicable

if the partner withdrew under the circumstances outlined in

Article 6.l." 2007 R., Vol. XII, p. 2309-11 (emphasis added). Since all parties agreed that Saint
Alphonsus had not withdrawn for any of the four reasons in Article 6.1, its dissociation was an
exercise of the statutory power to dissociate-albeit, in Judge McLaughlin's view, one that was
"wrongful" as defined in Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)-and therefore the statutory, rather than the
contractual buyout provisions, applied. Id. Thus, Judge McLaughlin's buyout decision did not
depend at all on his wrongful dissociation ruling, but rather on the undisputed fact, which this
Court's dissociation ruling confirmed, that the Hospital had dissociated pursuant to its power
granted by RUPA, and not under any of the four Article 6.1 grounds.

Second, even apart from the fact that Judge McLaughlin's buyout determination is law of
the case because it was unchallenged and left standing by the intervening appeal, it was clearly
correct as a matter of law. The trial court's decision to apply the statutory "buyout price"
provisions is well supported by a close reading of the partnership agreement. The clause in that

-3-

agreement providing a different "buyout price" methodology is the last sentence of a lengthy
paragraph setting forth the four legal and ethical grounds for a hospital partner's invocation of its
pre-RUPA contractual right to withdraw. See Trial Ex. 4023 § 6.1. Given this placement of the
clause, the trial court correctly concluded that the parties intended it to be "limited to those
enumerated four (4) reasons." 2007 R., Vol. XII, p. 2311.
Judge McLaughlin also correctly found this conclusion reinforced by the fact that the
four enumerated conditions in Article 6.1 involved circumstances "beyond the control of the
Hospital partners that could require [them] to dissociate quickly," and the "reduced" buyout
payment provisions in the agreement would ameliorate the otherwise resulting "significant
financial consequences for the partnership" of such a sudden and unforeseen withdrawal. Id at
2310. Accordingly, it made good sense to conclude that the agreement's limitations on the size
and terms of the departing partner's share recovery did not apply where a partner invoked the
"entirely new" general power to dissociate created by RUPA. Idaho Code § 53-3-601(1), official
cmt. 1. Given that Article 6.1 unambiguously provides a buyout formula "limited to those
enumerated four (4) reasons," 2007 R., Vol. XII, p. 2311, and that Saint Alphonsus exercised an
entirely new, general power to dissociate created by the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, the
statutory provisions governing partnership buyouts clearly control.
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II.

IF SAINT ALPHONSUS IS NOT AWARDED STATUTORY INTEREST FROM
THE DATE OF DISSOCIATION, THEN JUDGMENT INTEREST FROM 2007 IS
APPROPRIATE, AND IN EITHER CASE, SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED
TO ACCRUED INTEREST
MRIA contends that the trial court erred in running Saint Alphonsus's judgment interest

from September 21,2007, when Judge McLaughlin awarded Saint Alphonsus the $4.6 million
buyout price, and that the court further erred by awarding the accrued interest before offsetting
Saint Alphonsus'sjudgment against MRIA's. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 12-18. MRIA is wrong
on both counts. Indeed, as explained in Saint Alphonsus's principal appeal briefs, the Hospital is
actually entitled to interest running from the date of dissociation, April 1, 2004, by operation of
statute. See Appellants' Brief ("SA Br.") 64; Appellants' Reply Brief ("SA Reply Br.") Part V;
Idaho Code § 53-3-70 I (b) ("[i]nterest shall be paid from the date of dissociation to the date of
payment"). But if this Court were to affirm the trial court's holding that statutory interest is not
applicable, then it should also affirm the trial court's decision to award Saint Alphonsus its
accrued judgment interest from 2007, when Saint Alphonsus's right to recover its buyout share
was determined in a ruling that MRIA never appealed.!

! MRIA challenges only the district court's decision to award Saint Alphonsus accrued
judgment interest from 2007, and nowhere contends that Saint Alphonsus would not be entitled
to accrued interest if Saint Alphonsus were awarded statutory interest from the date of
dissociation pursuant to Idaho Code § 53-3-701(b). See MRIA Cross Appeal Br. 12-18 (making
no mention of statutory interest); accord MRIA Respondents' Br. 81-82 (making no argument
regarding offsets of statutory interest). This implicit concession is well founded since, if the
statute applies, it expressly provides a right to interest from the date of dissociation to the date of
payment irrespective of any judgment dates. Under the statute, therefore, Saint Alphonsus is
entitled to accrued interest from April 1,2004, until "payment" via offset against MRIA's 2012
judgment (with statutory interest continuing to accrue on any amounts still owing after offset).
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MRIA's objections to the court's interest award reflects a misunderstanding of what
offsets are. An offset is intended to ensure that the "demands of mutually indebted parties be set
off against each other and that only the balance be recovered." 20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim,
Recoupment, & Setoff§ 6. And where one party's right to recover accrues earlier than another's,

the value of the earlier judgment to be offset is its full value: principal plus already-accrued
interest.
For instance, in Wm. R. Clarke Corp. v. Safeco Insurance Co., 78 Cal. App. 4th 355, 357
(2000), subcontractor Clarke had, in 1993, obtained a judgment of $837,000 plus post-judgment
interest against Safeco (the contractor's bond company) for an unpaid job. Clarke, however,
owed its suppliers $208,000 for the same job-and those suppliers assigned their claims to
Safeco in 1997. Id. Safeco, now holding offsetting claims against Clarke, paid the outstanding
1993 judgment by first subtracting the value of its assigned claims from the judgment's principal,
and then calculating post-judgment interest on the remainder. Id. at 357-58. Both the trial court
and the appellate court found that this was improper. Id. at 357. They explained that Clarke's
right to recover against Safeco had accrued in 1993, when the judgment was originally awarded,
but Safeco had not obtained the "right to claim the amounts as offset" until years later. Id. at 360.
Accordingly, Clarke was entitled to the accrued interest on its full judgment from 1993 through
the time of the application of the offset. Id.
Likewise, in Cardinell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 302 A.D.2d 772, 773 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003), plaintiff Cardinell obtained a judgment for lost wages totaling $41,000, which had legally
been due to him for nearly ten years. With accrued interest for that nearly ten-year period, the
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award totaled nearly $400,000. Id. Allstate obtained a countervailing $50,000 judgment against
Cardinell, and argued that its judgment should have been offset against Cardinell' s recovery
before accrued interest was calculated. Id. The appellate court disagreed. It found that because
Allstate's "obligation to pay interest accrued before" its right to recover from Cardinell did, the
trial court correctly added the accrued interest to Cardinell'sjudgment before applying an offset.
Id. at 773-774. Several other cases apply this principle and add already-accrued interest before
applying offset. Malot v. Hadley, 794 P.2d 833,834-35 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (party entitled to
both principal and accrued interest on promissory note that was already legally accruing interest
by time of the offsetting judgment); West v. Sunbelt Enters., 530 So. 2d 433, 437 (Fla. Ct. App.
1988) (party "entitled to an offset by the amount of any interest accrued"); Acco Constructors,
Inc. v. Nat 'I Steel Prods. Co., 733 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (party is "entitled to
offset ... accrued interest").
Based on this common-sense authority, the trial court held that Saint Alphonsus was
entitled to accrued interest from the time it obtained entitlement to its $4.6 million buyout share.
As the court correctly noted, that award "was determined by Judge McLaughlin on September
21, 2007, in his findings of fact and conclusions oflaw" (and reflected in a contemporaneously
entered judgment), which MRIA "never appealed," meaning that Saint Alphonsus's "entitlement
'stands and remains the law of the case.'" R.5032. By contrast, the court noted that MRIA's
original entitlement to recovery was appealed, and vacated. Id. MRIA' s subsequent entitlement
to an award "was not adjudicated until January 18, 2012." Id. Since Saint Alphonsus' s
entitlement arose earlier than MRIA's, Saint Alphonsus was entitled to its accrued interest. Id.
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MRIA's arguments to the contrary are puzzling and would work a manifest injustice. As
its own authority recognizes, post-judgment interest is supposed to compensate "a successful
plaintiff for ... his or her loss during the time between ascertainment of the damage and
payment by the defendant." MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 14 (quoting c.J.S. Interest § 110). As the
trial court held, the ascertainment of Saint Alphonsus's damage occurred in 2007, and so Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to interest from that time until "payment"-in this case, application of the
offsetting judgment. 2
MRIA does not offer a single authority in which already-accrued interest was erased by
application of a subsequently determined right to an offset. The first two cases MRIA cites

2 There is no merit to MRIA's contention that Saint Alphonsus is not entitled to interest
from 2007 because this Court in the first appeal vacated the single judgment that encompassed
both the award to Saint Alphonsus and the separate award to MRIA. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 12.
Of course, the only reason there was just one judgment here is because Idaho Rule 54(b) requires
that when "parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other," the distinct
"judgments" must be merged into "single judgment for the difference." Here, Saint Alphonsus's
judgment was entirely offset by MRIA' s, and so the final, single judgment was in MRIA's favor.

Both law and logic require rejection ofMRIA's form-over-substance argument. Saint
Alphonsus should not suffer substantive harm because of Rule 54(b)'s housekeeping requirement
that multiple offsetting judgments be merged into one. In substance, Saint Alphonsus' sown,
unchallenged judgment was undisturbed by the prior appellate proceedings, and so the date of
the original award and judgment is the relevant date for purposes of post-judgment interest. See,
e.g., Munoz v. City of Union City, 173 Cal. App. 4th 199,206-07 (2009) (holding that "the
question when interest begins depends on substance, not formalism" and finding that the date
when "the plaintiffs' right to recovery" was established would be the date interest started, despite
subsequent post-remand proceedings); Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 87 F .3d 614, 619 (2d
Cir. 1996) (holding post-judgment interest runs from original date where appellate court had not
"disturbed" the findings underlying the judgment); cf Delong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Electro
Minerals Corp., 997 F.2d l340, 1342 (lIth Cir. 1993) ("In cases such as this one, which
reinstate a jury verdict for the plaintiff, we think that equity ordinarily, and perhaps always,
commands that interest be awarded from the date of the originaljudgment.").
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(MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 15) both involve the situation where the plaintiff's right to recovery
and the defendant's right to offset were adjudicated simultaneously, such that neither side had
accrued interest. See Cheung v. Wu, 919 A.2d 619, 622 (Me. 2007) (simultaneous offset after
trial where both plaintiff and defendant proved damages from each other's violations of same
contract); City ofAberdeen v. Rich, 658 N.W.2d 775, 777-78, 781 (S.D. 2003) (same, where
parties "agreed to set-off the damages award [for fraudulent land transfer] by the amount
expended by the defendants in [improving] the property").
The third case, Thomas & Betts Corp. v. A&A Mechanical, Inc., No. 2007-1034, 2008
WL 2696877 (Ky. Ct. App. July 11, 2008), applies the same principle to slightly different facts.
There, a jury awarded the plaintiff $366,000 for breach of warranty related to some HV AC units,
but the trial court refused to award the defendant an offsetting $170,000 that the plaintiff still
owed on the same equipment. Id. at * 1-2. On a first appeal, the appellate court held that the trial
court should have awarded the defendant judgment on its counterclaim as a matter of law, and
should have performed an offset. Id. On a second appeal, the appellate court held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to the interest that had accrued during the time between the original
judgment and the remand because, if the trial court had made the correct legal decision the first
time, the parties would have had simultaneous judgments, and interest would have accrued only
on the amount owing after those judgments were offset. Id. at *3. In other words, the first
appellate decision had corrected a legal error in the original judgment, and the second appellate
decision offset the awards in the manner that they would have been offset "had the trial court's
original action been correct." Id.
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None ofthese cases are applicable here for the very reason the trial court stated, that there
were no simultaneous judgments. R. 5032. Saint Alphonsus obtained its entitlement to $4.6
million in 2007, while MRIA's 2007 judgment rested on an improper legal basis and was vacated.
Id. MRIA was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law after the first appeal (unlike the

counterclaimant in Thomas & Betts), and thus did not establish its legal entitlement to any money
until the second jury issued a verdict in 2011 and the trial court entered judgment on it in 2012.
Moreover, unlike the cases MRIA cites, Saint Alphonsus's right to dissociate and recover its
departing-partner share was completely independent of the alleged contract and tort breaches on
which MRIA later obtained a recovery. There is no basis-and MRIA has cited no authorityby which the Court should allow a subsequent, unrelated judgment to offset Saint Alphonsus's
recovery, won more than four years earlier, without taking into account the significant interest
that accrued during the interim. If judgment interest, and not statutory interest, is to be awarded
here, then that interest began accruing in 2007 and was properly taken into account before
MRIA's judgment was offset.

III.

THE MRIA PARTNERSHIP WAS NOT FOR A DEFINITE TERM OR A
PARTICULAR UNDERTAKING
RUPA gives a partner a statutory right to dissociate from a partnership without liability

except where the dissociation "(1) ... is in breach of an express provision of the partnership
agreement; or (2) [i]n the case of a partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking, [a
partner dissociates in one of several specified ways] before the expiration of the term or the
completion of the undertaking." Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(1) & (2). After this Court held, on
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the first appeal, that Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation was not wrongful on grounds that it was in
violation of an express provision of the agreement, SADC, 148 Idaho at 486-490, 224 P .3d at
1075-79, the trial court on remand ruled that it also was not wrongful on either of the other two
grounds set forth in § 53-3-602. MRIA's challenges to that ruling have no merit.

A.

The Plain Language of the MRIA Partnership Agreement Creates an
Indefinite-Term Partnership as a Matter of Law

To find that a partnership was created for a definite term within the meaning of RUPA,
Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(2), "there must be clear evidence of an agreement among the partners
that the partnership ... has a minimum or maximum duration." Id. § 53-3-101 cmt. By contrast,
if the parties agree that the partnership "may last indefinitely," until some uncertain future date,
then they "have not agreed to remain partners until the expiration of a definite term." Id. § 53-3101 (10) & cmt. Here, the trial court ruled correctly that the partnership agreement was, as a
matter oflaw, for an indefinite term. More specifically, it held that the "clear and
unambiguous ... language of the Agreement, when reading the contract as a whole and giving
meaning to all the words and phrases, is that it was a partnership meant to end when 7/9ths (now
8/1 Oths) of the partners voted to dissolve the partnership." R.558-59. Thus, since the

partnership agreement unambiguously provides that it will last indefinitely, the court correctly
held that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation could not have breached a definite term. Id. at 559.

First, where a contract represents the complete and integrated agreement of the parties,
and sets forth the parties' agreement on a particular subject in "plain and unambiguous language,"
then the language of the contract will govern and "the intention of the parties must be determined
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from the contract itself." Rowan v. Riley, 139 Idaho 49,54, 72 P.3d 889, 894 (2003). And given
the "comprehensive nature" of the MRIA partnership agreement, see Country Cove Development,

Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 603,150 P.3d 288,296 (2006), and the agreement's specific
language, there can be no dispute that that agreement is a complete and integrated contract that
governs the parties' interactions in connection with the partnership. Passing review of the
twenty-page document demonstrates its thorough character, addressing not merely the many
routine issues of partnership organization and governance, see, e.g., Trial Ex. 4023 §§ 2.1,5.15.5, but a range of possible contingencies as well, see id. §§ 6.1-6.3, 7.1-7.5. Such thoroughness
of an agreement that is "not ambiguous, nor ... missing terms" demonstrates its integrated
character. Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 260, 92 P.3d 503, 510 (2004). 3

Second, this integrated partnership agreement addresses explicitly the issue of the
partnership's term of duration in a separate Section 1.1 of the agreement devoted to the
"Effective Date and Term" of the contract. Trial Ex. 4023 § l.1 (emphasis added). Section l.1.1
provides that the MRIA partnership would end on December 31, 1985, if certain formative steps
were not completed by that date, id. §§ 1.1, 1.1.1, and Section 1.1.2 provides that if those

3 For example, the parties specifically "agree that the conduct of the Partnership shall be
in accordance with the terms and provisions herein set forth," Trial Ex. 4023 at 1, and that
"[t]hese Articles of Partnership may be amended only through written instrument executed by all
of the Partners," id. § 12.1. Such a "'provision of the agreement prohibiting oral modifications is
enforceable, despite any common law antagonism to "no oral modification" provisions, '" SADC,
148 Idaho at 497, 224 P.3d at 1086 (quoting Idaho Code § 53-2-110, official cmt.), and a
"provision in a contract to the effect that the written terms may not be varied by prior or oral
agreements because all such agreements have been merged into the written document" is "one
means of proving that the writing was intended as a complete statement of the parties agreement,"
Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 44 & n.3, 740 P.2d 1022, 1029 & n.3 (1987).
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specified formative steps were timely completed (as undisputedly occurred here), "then the term
of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable time after the business of
the Partnership is wound up and dissolved under Article 10," id. § 1.1.2. Article 10, in turn,
provides that "[a]t a meeting of the Board of Partners held in Boise, Idaho, pursuant to due notice,
the Partnership may be dissolved through the affirmative vote of seven-ninths (7/9) or more of
the eligible votes of the Board of Partners." The parties thus plainly considered the question of
the partnership's duration, and expressly agreed, as the trial court correctly found, that once the
partnership was initiated, it would last until "the partners voted to dissolve the partnership." R.
559. By thus agreeing that the partnership would last indefinitely, until this future date when
they would act to dissolve it, the parties certainly "have not agreed to remain partners until the
expiration of a definite term." Idaho Code § 53-3-101 (1 0) & cmt. 4 Accordingly, the language of

§ 1.1.2 at issue here plainly establishes a contract of indefinite duration.

This Court has held (in determining the applicability of the statute of frauds) that a
contract is not for a "definite term of duration" where it provides for contractual obligations to
continue "as long as" certain specified circumstances exist. Gen. Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine
Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 856-57, 979 P.2d 1207, 1214-15 (1999). Other courts have found
similar language expressly creates an "indefinite" term of duration. See, e.g., Zee Med. Distrib.
Ass 'n, Inc. v. Zee Med., Inc., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10 (2000) (indefinite term where the "contract
'shall continue' until grounds arise for termination"); Kruse v. GS PEP Tech. Fund 2000 LP, No.
1:10-CV-323, 2013 WL 1343660, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 2, 2013) (indefinite term when
partnership would dissolve "one year after the date by which all of the Partnership's Partnership
Investments have been liquidated"); Fremont Lumber Co. v. Starrell Petrol. Co., 364 P.2d 773,
776 (Or. 1961) (indefinite term where contract continued "as long thereafter as oil, gas or other
mineral is produced from [specified] land").
4
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B.

MRIA's Contention That the Partnership Agreement Contemplates That Its
Life Is Defined by the Terms of Its Limited Partnerships Is Contrary to the
Contractual Language

Notwithstanding this clear language establishing an indefinite term, MRIA still claims
contract ambiguity and discusses extrinsic evidence, arguing that the MRIA partnership's
duration is actually defined by reference to the durational term of the Center and Mobile limited
partnership agreements. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 22-23. This assertion fails at the threshold in
view of the contract's explicit indefinite term, its provision requiring that any amendment be in
writing, see Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828, 11 P.3d 20, 24 (2000), and the fact that the
limited partnership agreements plainly do not amend the MRIA agreement. s
Not surprisingly, MRIA's purported authority to justifY the consideration of such
extrinsic evidence consists of completely distinguishable, out-of-state cases, which do not even
involve integrated written contracts embodying provisions addressing contract duration. 6 Indeed,
in one of the cited cases, the court found that an agreement was for a particular undertaking (not

5 The MRI Center and MRI Mobile agreements, executed after the MRIA general
partnership agreement, do not even reference Section 1.1, or the general partnership's term, and
they are not signed by all of the MRI general partners. Trial Ex. 4024 (MRI Center limited
partnership agreement); Trial Ex. 4028 (MRI Mobile limited partnership agreement); see also
Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 539,
548,916 P.2d 1264, 1273 (1996) (party's "contractual rights ... [may] not be taken away by a
contract between [different parties]"); Miami Subs Corp. v. Murray Family Trust, 703 A.2d 1366,
l371 (N.H. 1997) (provisions of a separate contract "executed after the partnership was formed[]
cannot be read to inform the [durational] term[] of the earlier partnership agreement").

See MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 24. The contract at issue in 68th Street Apartments, Inc. v.
Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78,80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), was entirely oral, and thus did not
involve the sort of integration that forecloses parole evidence. And in Mervyn Investment Co. v.
Biber, 184 Cal. 637,641 (1921), which predates RUPA, the resort to extrinsic evidence was
permissible because there was "no express agreement under the contract" regarding duration.
6
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a definite tenn) by relying on the "specific[]" language of "the partnership agreement itself," and
not on any extrinsic evidence. Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98,106 (Ky. 2006). MRIA thus
offers no precedent for allowing extrinsic proof concerning the parties' intent where a
comprehensive, integrated agreement expressly addresses the contract's duration in words that
make it indefinite, and allows for modification only by written amendment.
In any event, MRIA's convoluted argument that the tenn of the MRIA agreement ends
with the tenns of the limited partnerships makes no sense. MRIA says that Section 1.1.2 of the
MRIA partnership agreement ties the end of the term of the partnership to the winding up and
dissolution of the "business of the Partnership," and that this phrase must be read to refer to the
termination of the limited partnerships (Center and Mobile) that, according to MRIA, constitute
the sole "business of' MRIA. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 22. This is plainly wrong.
Most obviously, the reference to the "business of the Partnership" upon which MRIA
relies is part of a longer provision saying that "the tenn of this Partnership shall end on the date
which is within a reasonable time after the business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved

under Article 10." Trial Ex. 4023, § 1.1.2 (emphasis added). Article 10, in turn, unambiguously
sets out the procedures for the dissolution, liquidation, and winding up of the MRIA partnership

itself, and includes a requirement of an "affinnative vote of seven-ninths (7/9) or more of the
eligible votes of the [MRIA] Board of Partners." Trial Ex. 4023, § 10.l. Thus, the phrase "the
business of the Partnership" is unambiguously being used in Section 1.1.2 to refer not to some
other business entity managed or controlled by the MRIA partnership, but to the MRIA
partnership itself. Also, by requiring an affirmative vote of seven-ninths of the Board (later
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amended to eight-tenths, see Trial Ex. 4032, § 9.1) before the MRIA partnership can be wound
up and dissolved, and thereby have its "term ... end[ed]" under Section l.1.2, Article 10 ensures
that MRIA will continue---even after the end of the fixed terms of Center and Mobile-until the
partners vote to dissolve MRIA. Thus, when read in the context of its cross-reference to Article
10, Section 1.1.2 unambiguously provides that MRIA shall end only when the partners vote to
dissolve the partnership, the timing of which is uncertain and indefinite.
MRIA is also certainly wrong in claiming that the "Agreement makes clear that MRIA' s
sole purpose would be to manage the affairs of the limited partnerships," such that MRIA's term
is necessarily defined by the purportedly "fixed duration" of the Center and Mobile limited
partnerships. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 23 (emphasis in original). For Section l.6 of the
partnership agreement unambiguously defines "[t]he purpose of' the MRIA partnership in broad
terms not at all limited to the affairs of Center and/or Mobile, including:
to purchase, lease or otherwise acquire, finance, manage, operate, use,
control, hold, sell and otherwise transfer medical diagnostic devices,
equipment and accessories and therapeutic devices, equipment and
accessories related to such diagnostic devices and equipment, together
with buildings and other facilities associated therewith, and to transact any
and all business matters incident thereto.
Trial Ex. 4023, § 1.6. While the same section states an "initial" plan to acquire and operate MRI
equipment, and to organize a limited partnership with the same purpose, no language forecloses
expansion into other types of equipment or addition of other partnerships. Indeed, the provision
expressly allows for an open-ended possibility of future expansion, as the final sentence
unambiguously states that both "[t]his Partnership" and "any entity in which it has an ownership
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interest" (i.e., not just the contemplated limited partnership) may engage in the "business
activity ... set forth above." Id. (emphasis added). In fact, the very existence ofMRI Mobile
demonstrates the point, since MRI Center was the "Limited Partnership" specifically mentioned
as the "initial" enterprise, yet some three years later, MRIA created another entity, MRI Mobile,
and engaged in operating that business as wel1. 7
Thus, MRIA's assertion that Section 1.6 limits the business of the MRIA general
partnership "sole[ly]" to managing "the Limited Partnership," or even to managing two limited
partnerships, cannot be reconciled with the section's words-indeed it would render them
"meaningless." Point of Rocks Ranch, L.L. C. v. Sun Valley Title Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 411, 413,
146 P.3d 677,679 (2006). It would also make the creation of both MRI Mobile and IsoScan (see
supra note 7) ultra vires. For this and all the reasons set forth above, the MRIA agreement is not
one for a definite term.
7 In fact, MRIA's "business" does not even end with Center and Mobile. In 2004, MRIA
created a limited liability company called IsoScan, LLC, of which MRIA is the only listed
member and also the entity in which "management" of IsoScan is vested. See R. 512. IsoScan
operates mobile PET/CT scanners. See R. 500-01.

Obviously, the fact that there are multiple limited partnerships with different end dates
necessarily precludes any reference to the limited partnerships from creating a definitive end date
for the general partnership. MRIA itself implicitly concedes the point, arguing that MRIA's term
was extended from 2015 to 2018 by the creation ofMRI Mobile. MRIA Cross-Appeal Bf. 23.
Thus, even under MRIA's own argument, the MRIA partnership term is not fixed-its end date
fluctuates depending on the lifespan of any existing limited partnerships or other business
entities whose affairs are managed by MRIA (such as IsoScan, LLC), that is, "so long as" any
business is operating. Gen. Auto Parts Co., 132 Idaho at 856-57,979 P.2d at 1214-15. Under
MRIA's own view, the partnership necessarily lasts until all of its existing limited partnerships,
LLCs, and other business activities are wound up and dissolved, and no new ones are created.
Thus, reference to the limited partnership terms could not possibly provide a definite term for
MRIA itself, even if such reference were not completely foreclosed by the express definite term
provision in the MRIA agreement.
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C.

The MRIA General Partnership Agreement Is Not an Agreement That
Expires at the End of a Particular Undertaking

While MRIA's brief makes the bare assertion that the partnership agreement was for a
"particular undertaking," see MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 21, it does not make any specific
argument regarding this prong of the dissociation statute, but rather blends it together with its
erroneous claim that the partnership ends when the limited partnerships do. See, e.g., id at 23
(asserting that "because these limited partnerships had specific dates of termination, the MRIA
partnership was for a term or particular undertaking").
In any event, the MRIA partnership was plainly not created for a "particular undertaking"
within the meaning ofIdaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(2). The statute's official comments explain
that partnerships for particular undertakings are partnerships that end after discrete one-time
events, and give examples like "market[ing] an art book" and "construct[ing] an apartment
building." Idaho Code § 53-3-101 official cmt. By contrast, ongoing operations, such as a
partnership to "operate a linen supply business" or "to contract and operate a bowling alley"--or
to operate an MRI business-are not particular undertakings. Id

IV.

MRIA'S "CONTRACTUAL" THEORY OF WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION IS
INCONSISTENT WITH RUPA AND THIS COURT'S PRIOR RULINGS
Relabeling the Hospital's dissociation a contractual "withdrawal" under the MRIA

partnership agreement, MRIA argues in the alternative that the dissociation was wrongful
because it breached Section 6.l of the partnership agreement. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 18-2l.
But this is the very assertion that this Court rejected on the first appeal. SADC, 148 Idaho at
487-89,224 P.3d at 1076-78. The enactment of RUPA "dramatically change[d] the law
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governing partnership breakups" by creating an "entirely new concept, 'dissociation'" which
allows a partner to "ceas[e] to be associated in the carrying on of the business." Idaho Code
§ 53-3-601 official cmt. 1. And RUPA expressly states that such dissociation will be "wrongful
only if' one of three conditions-involving three defined types of contract breaches-is met.

Idaho Code § 53-3-602 (b) (emphasis added).
This Court's prior decision, and a subsequent decision of the trial court, R. 556-59,
establish that none of these three conditions apply, and that the Hospital's dissociation was thus
"rightful" under RUP A. That means that it was affirmatively authorized under that statute. See
Idaho Code § 53-3-602(a). MRIA's refusal to accept this fact is demonstrated by its continuing
incorrect assertion, discussed in the principal appeal briefs, that a "rightful" dissociation under
RUPA can nonetheless be wrongful if done with an impure state of mind. See SA Br. 43-48;
Respondents' Br. 49,57; SA Reply Br. Part ILA. 8
It is also demonstrated by this argument on cross-appeal, which MRIA pressed repeatedly

before and during trial once it was clear that the dissociation met none of the three criteria for
wrongfulness under RUPA. 9 In essence, MRIA asks this Court to simply to override RUPA on

MRIA deems it appropriate to mention once again, in a footnote of its cross-appeal brief,
that Saint Alphonsus could alternatively be liable for a withdrawal undertaken in bad faith, in
order to "feather" its own "nest," notwithstanding that its conduct meets none of the three
preconditions of wrongfulness under RUPA. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 21 n.3.
8

9 For example, in its amended counterclaim filed after remand, MRIA expressly asserted,
contrary to this Court's decision in SADC, that the Hospital could still be held liable for wrongful
dissociation in breach of an express term of the contract. R. 85-113
45,63,66, 72. The trial
court granted Saint Alphonsus's motion to strike these allegations, finding that MRIA's claims of
wrongful dissociation in breach of the partnership agreement "directly conflict with, and thus are
inconsistent with, the Idaho Supreme Court's ... decision." R. 548-49.

n
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the ground that, "although [RUPA] grants the right to dissociate [absent any of the three types of
contract breaches necessary to establish wrongfulness], it does not preclude a claim for
withdrawal in breach of the partnership agreement." MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 18. But that
assertion is clearly wrong.
MRIA's principal contention rests on a word game of distinguishing between
"withdrawal" and "dissociation." MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 18. But no such distinction is
possible because RUPA uses those words interchangeably.1O And RUPA made withdrawal
rightful except in three specified instances, and also made very clear that common-law and
equitable principles do not apply if they are "displaced by particular provisions of this act." Id.
§ 53-3-104(a). RUPA necessarily displaced-and thus foreclosed-claims that a dissociation
breached the contract other than in the specific ways enumerated in the statute.

(continued ... )

MRIA then took another tack, arguing unsuccessfully that Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation
was wrongful as a common-law breach of contract (the issue described in this section). Having
lost that issue, MRIA then took a third bite at the apple, arguing at trial that Saint Alphonsus's
lawful dissociation was actionable as a breach of fiduciary duty. See SA Br. 43-48. The trial
court's instructions erroneously suggested to the jury that this theory was plausible, and a new
trial should be granted the Hospital as a result. See id.
10 See, e.g., Idaho Code § 53-3-103 official cmt. 8 ("Section 602( a) continues the
traditional UP A Section 31 (2) rule that every partner has the power to withdraw from the
partnership at any time, which power can not be bargained away," "except to require that the
notice of withdrawal under Section 601 (1) be in writing."); id. § 53-3-601 official cmt. 2
("Section 602(a) provides that a partner has the power to withdraw at anytime. The power to
withdraw is immutable under Section 103(b )(6), with the exception that the partners may agree
the notice must be in writing."); id. § 53-3-602 official cmt. 1 ("Subsection (a) states
explicitly ... that a partner has the power to dissociate at any time by expressing a will to
withdraw, even in contravention of the partnership agreement.") (all emphasis added).
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In creating this affirmative right to withdraw, RUPA applied the law retroactively so as to
"govern all partnerships" as ofJuly 1,2001. Idaho Code § 53-3-1204(b). Thus, "[u]nder
subsection (b), application of the Act bec[ame] mandatory for all partnerships, including existing
partnerships that did not previously elect to be governed by it" before that date. Idaho Code

§ 53-3-1204 official cmt. The MRIA partnership agreement thus came to embody the new right
of dissociation as RUPA defined it, see Robinson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 263,
265-66,596 P.2d 436, 438-39 (1979) (contract must be construed to include statutory rights), and
it was entirely appropriate for Saint Alphonsus's notice of withdrawal (Ex. 4329) to rely
explicitly upon the RUPA right to dissociate.]]
As a result, an act of dissociation that is defined as "rightful" under the express language
of RUPA cannot be rendered wrongful on other grounds not contemplated by the statute,
whether they be other provisions of the contract or alleged impure thoughts in the mind of the
Hospital administrators.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CLAIMS RELATED TO
IMI EAGLE, WHICH DID NOT EVEN OPEN UNTIL TWO YEARS AFTER
SAINT ALPHONSUS HAD A RIGHT TO COMPETE WITH MRIA
In order to establish usurpation, a party must prove that there was an actual business

opportunity that it was able to undertake. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424, 428, 64 P.3d 953,
957 (2003). At the close ofMRIA's evidence, Saint Alphonsus moved for a directed verdict that

]1 Since RUPA was expressly made retroactive, it has been widely recognized that, under
it, a party could be "left with a set of partnership termination provisions far different from those
upon which he counted at the inception of the partnership," including a right to "dissociate from
the partnership." Allan W. Vestal, "Wide Open": Nevada's Innovative Market in Partnership
Law, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 275, 278 (2007).
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no such opportunity had been shown with respect to the city of Eagle, where Saint Alphonsus
and IMI did not open a facility until2007-well after Saint Alphonsus's non-compete ended (in
April 2005) and, indeed, after the first trial in this case had already been concluded. R. 2850-51.
The trial court agreed. Tr., Vol. 27, pp. 6068:24-6070:7. The court found that Eagle was
only "discussed as a possible area of expansion," and that Eagle was not an actual "opportunity"
that arose before the dissociation in 2004. Id. It also held that the opening of the Eagle facility
was "too remote in time from both the dissociation and the expiration of the non-compete
obligation to find that damages, if found, may be awarded for the Eagle facility profits that might
have been realized by the MRI entities or the profits Saint Alphonsus realized under a
disgorgement theory." Id
This ruling was correct. As usurpation is an equitable claim, the trial court was required
to make findings of fact. See, e.g., Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 796, 229 P.3d 1146, 1158
(2010); Tr., Vol. 29, p. 6567:16-21; R. at 3285 (MRIA conceding same). As such, this Court
"will not disturb the trial court's factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial
evidence." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 749 n.l, 274 P.3d 1256, 1264 n.l (2012).
The court's finding that there was no Eagle opportunity is well supported, particularly given that
MRIA offered almost no evidence regarding Eagle whatsoever, let alone sufficient evidence to
prove that Saint Alphonsus took that opportunity from MRIA.
The entirety of MRIA' s factual evidence regarding the alleged usurpation of MRI
Mobile's ability to open an Eagle facility is a brief snippet oftestimony ofMRIA's former CEO
Jack Floyd (Tr., Vol. 19, pp. 3905-10), who stated that he gave a 2001 PowerPoint presentation
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(which is not in the record) "relate[d] to the need for a site in either Meridian or Eagle." Id., p.
3908:5-10. Floyd testified that "there was a sense of urgency that we, Saint AI's, as part of the
MRIA partnership, get into the MeridianlEagle area. But yet that sense of urgency did not seem
to be shared." Id. That is all. MRIA did not offer any evidence explaining how Saint
Alphonsus blocked MRI Mobile from going to Eagle; no evidence that Saint Alphonsus's vote
was necessary for MRI Mobile to go to Eagle; no evidence that Saint Alphonsus was discussing
going to Eagle with IMI at this time (as opposed to MRIA's claims regarding Meridian); and no
evidence that Saint Alphonsus somehow prevented MRI Mobile from going to Eagle for nearly
three years after Saint Alphonsus dissociated. Also, Floyd's testimony was that MRIA wanted a
site in "either" Meridian "or" Eagle, not both, and the court permitted MRIA to pursue and
recover upon its less-remote Meridian usurpation claim.
MRIA does not even claim that Saint Alphonsus prevented MRI Mobile from going to
Eagle. Nor could it, since Saint Alphonsus had only two often votes on the MRIA board. 12
Instead, it acknowledges that MRIA itself decided not to go there, blaming Saint Alphonsus
because it had no sense of "urgency" to go to Eagle in 200 I and "MRIA would not undertake
any action that its partner, Saint Alphonsus, was opposed to." MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 28-29.
MRIA's acknowledged passivity cannot, in any linguistic or legal sense, be viewed as Saint
12 See Ex. 4023, § 5.1.2 (providing that Saint Alphonsus held only two often votes in
MRIA); id. § 5.4 (MRIA's business decisions, with limited exceptions, required only five often
votes). Indeed, contrary to MRIA's assertion that Saint Alphonsus's alleged lack of support
equates to a usurped opportunity, Mobile was at this same time sending magnets to multiple
locations around the Pacific Northwest despite Saint Alphonsus's alleged lack of support. See
Ex. 5043 (map ofMRI Mobile locations); Tr., Vol. 5, p. 773:3-9 (representing that map shows
all current and past MRI Mobile locations).
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Alphonsus "taking" that opportunity for itself, particularly when none of the entities involved in
this case had a facility in Eagle until 2007.
In any event, MRIA' s claim for lost profits regarding the alleged usurpation of an Eagle
opportunity should also be rejected for the separate reason that the estimate of the profits lost by
MRI Mobile (the entity MRIA claims would have opened in Eagle) offered by MRIA's expert
Bruce Budge is inadequate to support any jury verdict of damages. As with Budge's lost-profits
estimate for the alleged usurpation of IMI Meridian, Budge failed to present evidence of what
MRI Mobile's own scan volumes, profits, and costs would have been in Eagle, but rather just
"assume[d]," in violation of Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172
P.3d 1119, 1122 (2007), that Mobile would have had the same volumes, margins, and profits as
IMI Eagle. See SA Br. 26-29; SA Reply Br. Part I.B. Budge's analysis of Eagle and Meridian
were identical and, indeed, Budge simply lumped Eagle in with his Meridian analysis. Tr., Vol.
21, p. 4553:9-12. MRIA's evidence thus did not support a lost-profits award for Eagle.
Given the inadequacy of its "lost Eagle opportunity" claim, MRIA advances two other
arguments for Eagle damages. Both are meritless. First, MRIA invents for this appeal an
entirely new justification for Eagle damages-that IMI's Meridian location "was serving Eagle's"
market, such that the 2007 Eagle location simply siphoned off Meridian's business and thus
MRIA should be able to recover Eagle damages as a consequence of the alleged wrongdoing in
Meridian. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 30-31. But this theory was never raised in the trial court (see
R. 2940-42), and for that reason alone should be rejected, since "[t]his Court will not consider
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issues raised for the first time on appeal," Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,
812,252 P.3d 71, 93 (2011).
This new theory is also unsound because it is not supported by citation to any factual or
expert testimony, but rather rests entirely on counsel's speculation as to the relationship between
Meridian's and Eagle's relative profits. MRIA merely assumes that there is a causal relationship
between Eagle's profit figures and Meridian's reduced profits, namely, that Eagle's customer
base comprises patients who used to go to Meridian. MRIA Cross-Appeal Br. 31. There is no
evidence supporting this, id., and, indeed, neither ofMRIA's damages experts made any claim
that MRIA's Meridian damages included profits lost to IMI's Eagle location. See Tr., Vol. 21,
pp. 4544:23-4546:22, 4553:20-4554:3 (Budge analyzing Meridian and Eagle separately); id. Vol.
22, pp. 4720:9-4721 :18 (Wilhoite testifying that he simply built on Budge's approach). Nor is

there any apparent reason to reject or discount alternative causation theories, including that IMI
Meridian's profitability was reduced for the entirely different reason, consistent with the actual
trial record, that IMI's entry into Meridian was followed by several competitors. Tr., Vol. 27, p.
6176:9-6178:25; Ex. 991. For all these reasons, MRIA's newly concocted, speculative theory as
to the relationship between Meridian and Eagle should certainly not be heard now.
Second, MRIA argues that it should be awarded disgorgement damages for Eagle, not

because Saint Alphonsus took the opportunity to enter Eagle per se, but rather because Saint
Alphonsus usurped MRIA's ability to join IMI when IMI was formed in 1999. MRIA CrossAppeal Br. 27-28. This argument has no merit. The trial court twice considered MRIA's claim
and rejected it on the grounds that IMI's opening of an Eagle facility in 2007, years after
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dissociation, was far too remote from the alleged usurpation to allow for disgorgement. Tr., Vol.
27, pp. 6068:24-6069:12; R. 3363 (MRIA requesting reconsideration of Eagle disgorgement
ruling); R. 3369 (trial court findings of fact and conclusions oflaw again rejecting Eagle
disgorgement award). 13 In doing so, the trial court correctly applied the law because, "[w ]hen a
court finds the profits are 'the product of legitimate contributions by the defendant that should
not, in justice, be awarded to the claimant,' it may deny them as 'too remote' to warrant
disgorgement." Nat 'I R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 14,
20 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 51); see also Uzyel v. Kadisha,
116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244,266-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (question in a usurpation case is "whether
particular profits are fairly attributable to [defendant's] misconduct or, on the other hand, too
remote to justify disgorgement").
Moreover, in exercising its equitable discretion to deny the Eagle profits as remote-a
decision reviewable here for abuse of discretion, see Uzyel, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 266-67-the
trial court plainly arrived at the correct conclusion. MRIA offered no evidence to suggest that, in
the but-for world where MRIA would partner with IMI, this hypothetical new partnership would
have opened an Eagle facility, particularly given the court's factual finding that, in the real world,
Eagle did not become an actual opportunity for any party for eight years after IMI' s creation.
This was also several years after Saint Alphonsus lawfully dissociated, ceased all alleged
wrongdoing, and made its own legitimate contributions to IMI's business.

13 Along with the 1999 disgorgement theory as a whole, any such theory is also time
barred. See SA Br 37-39; SA Reply Br. Part I.E.
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VI.

SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS ON THE CROSSAPPEAL
MRIA seeks attorney fees on its cross-appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (civil action

arising out of any commercial transaction). If the Court rules for Saint Alphonsus, then Saint
Alphonsus, not MRIA, will be the prevailing party on these issues, and thus the Court should
award Saint Alphonsus its appellate fees and costs incurred in responding to the cross-appeal
issues in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the rulings below as to each of the
issues raised in MRIA's cross-appeal.
Dated: September 16, 2013

Respectfully Submitted,

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
Thomas 1. Davis
JONES DAY
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Washington, D.C. 20001-2113
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